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IKE MUCH OF the rest of the nation, Texas is enjoying a low-
inflation, low-unemployment economy. The Texas misery
index—the sum of the inflation and unemployment rates—
is bouncing near its 30-year low (Chart 1), and both its com-
ponents are lower than they were during the early-1980s
boom. Unemployment is below 4 percent in more than half
the state and, for the first time in recent memory, in single digits
along much of the border.
In a low-unemployment environment, labor force growth limits
employment growth, and barring a major change in the percentage
of the population seeking work, population growth limits labor force
growth. Therefore, the patterns of unemployment, labor force par-
ticipation and population growth will heavily influence the economic
future of Texas. This article explores these patterns and discusses
their implications.
Unemployment
Unemployment rates in Texas vary widely (Chart 2). For example,
the unemployment rate is more than seven times as high in McAllen
as it is in Bryan/College Station. Unemployment tends to be higher
along the coast and on the border with Mexico and lower in North
and Central Texas. Interestingly, three of the four cities with the lowest
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THEECONOMICSOFPROSPERITY: ATEXASTALErates—Austin, Bryan/College Station and
Lubbock—are also home to major state
universities.
While levels vary substantially, there
is definitely a common trend in Texas
unemployment rates. As Chart 2 shows,
unemployment has been falling through-
out the state. Over the past year, rates
have fallen everywhere except oil-sensi-
tive cities like Houston and Midland/
Odessa (and Bryan/College Station,
where there was essentially no room for
further declines). The decreases have
been particularly sharp in Brownsville,
McAllen and Texarkana, where unem-
ployment fell more than 2.5 percentage
points between July 1998 and July 1999.
Unemployment rates in Dallas, Fort
Worth, Killeen, San Antonio, Sherman
and Waco are now less than half what
they were when rates began falling
seven years ago. Unemployment in Dal-
las and Fort Worth hasn’t been lower in
20 years.
Labor Force Participation
Labor force participation also varies
dramatically across Texas. The civilian
participation rate is the share of the
working-age population (that is, every-
one over 16) that is working or actively
seeking work.  It excludes people who
are in the military, retired, attending
school full time, keeping house or stay-
ing at home with the kids. Labor force
participation rates tend to be highest in
communities with relatively few people
of retirement age or children in need 
of parental supervision and lowest in
areas with low real wages and high un-
employment.
Chart 3 illustrates deviations from the
national average participation rate of 67
percent. As the chart shows, rates are
already quite high in much of the state,
particularly in areas with low unem-
ployment. (The major exception is
Killeen, where Fort Hood skews the
data.) The participation rates for Austin
and Dallas are more than 10 percentage
points above the national average.
Among major U.S. cities, only Min-
neapolis/St. Paul has a higher rate than
Dallas/Fort Worth.
Overall, Texas participation rates have
been drifting upward in metropolitan
areas with low unemployment and drift-
ing downward in areas with high un-
employment; beyond that, there has
been little meaningful change among
the metros. The Texas areas with the
highest rates in 1998—Austin, Dallas,
Fort Worth and Houston—also had the
highest when unemployment rates be-
gan falling in 1992. Among major Texas
metropolitan areas, only Austin has seen
a substantial increase in its participation
rate over this period of tightening labor
markets. Austin’s rate rose from 75 per-
cent in 1992 to 81 percent in 1998.
Population Growth
The Texas population tends to grow
at twice the national rate. Two impor-
tant factors explain this pace—a faster
rate of natural increase (meaning that
the young Texas population produces
substantially more births than deaths
each year) and strong net domestic mi-
gration (meaning that more people
from elsewhere in the country move in
than Texans move out). However, as
Chart 4 shows, there is at least as much
variation in Texas’ population growth
rates as there is in its unemployment
and labor force participation rates.
The working-age population is grow-
ing most rapidly in Laredo, McAllen,
Austin and Dallas. Laredo and McAllen
benefit from especially strong rates of
natural increase and international migra-
tion; on net, domestic migration has a
negligible effect on these cities. In con-
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Chart 3
Deviations from the 
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Census.trast, Dallas and Austin grow more
rapidly than much of the rest of the state
because net domestic migration is so
strong. In 1998, 51,000 people moved
into these two metro areas from else-
where in Texas and the United States.
At the other end of the spectrum, do-
mestic migration was the primary source
of drag on the weakest Texas metros.
The areas shown in brown in Chart 4
lost population to other parts of the
state and the nation in 1998. Interest-
ingly, no Texas metro area lost popula-
tion to international migration in 1998.
Implications
All tight labor markets experience
the same economic forces, albeit to
varying degrees. Therefore, focusing on
one or two can illustrate the broader
economic implications for the state as a
whole.
Austin and Dallas have by far the
tightest labor markets in Texas. Unem-
ployment rates are low, and labor force
participation is unusually high. As a
consequence, there are nearly nine jobs
for every 10 residents between the ages
of 16 and 65 in Austin and Dallas.
Meanwhile, population growth has not
kept up with recent job growth (non-
farm employment in both areas has in-
creased by at least 4 percent a year for
the past three years). Something’s got to
give. Because there will always be some
“frictional unemployment,” as workers
search between jobs or gather informa-
tion upon entering the labor force,
there is little room for unemployment
rates to fall further. Therefore, the cur-
rent rate of job growth in Austin and
Dallas is unsustainable without a signif-
icant increase in either labor force par-
ticipation or net migration.
The market forces needed to lure
workers into the Austin and Dallas
labor forces will induce a number of
changes. First, there will be significant
upward pressure on labor compensa-
tion. As many employers find them-
selves chasing the same set of workers,
bidding wars will erupt for workers
with specific skills. A recent Manpower
survey indicated that one-fifth of Dallas
employers were planning to hire in the
fourth quarter. Some of them had best
prepare for sticker shock. It’s becoming
a seller’s market for labor in Austin and
Dallas.
Increasing labor compensation may
not take the form of rising wages, how-
ever. Industry contacts suggest that
working environment, fringe benefits
and stock options are becoming an in-
creasingly important part of the total
compensation package.
Higher compensation should increase
labor force participation, but the near-
term effect is likely to be modest. Par-
ticipation rates tend to change at a
glacial pace, Austin’s recent experience
notwithstanding. For example, the
Texas rate has changed less than 1 per-
centage point over the course of the
decade. Simple diminishing returns will
keep Austin from continuing to increase
its participation rate at the pace of the
past eight years.
Higher compensation is more likely to
attract economic migrants than to draw
existing residents out of the woodwork.
Therefore, tightening labor markets in
Austin and Dallas could increase the
rate of net domestic migration into the
two areas. Such a change would only
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SOURCE: Bureau of the Census.reinforce an existing trend; as Chart 5
shows, the Texas metros with the tightest
labor markets experienced the greatest
net domestic migration in 1998. 
On the other hand, as economic con-
ditions have improved nationwide, the
factors that were pushing workers out
of other states have dissipated, and any
influx of workers would bid up housing
costs and push up the cost of living in
Austin and Dallas. These factors could
counterbalance the attraction of wage
increases. So unless labor compensa-
tion rises dramatically, net migration
into the two areas is unlikely to accel-
erate markedly.
It is more likely that tight labor mar-
kets in the two areas will attract com-
muters from the surrounding counties.
Such a pattern is particularly likely in
Dallas. There are two yardsticks by which
metro area employment is measured: by
the location of the worker and by the
location of the firm that employs the
workers. Usually, the worker-based
measure of household employment pro-
duces a higher job count because it 
includes self-employed and agricultural
workers who are not captured by the
establishment survey. Since 1997, how-
ever, the Dallas establishment survey
has reported more jobs than the house-
hold survey. This shift could arise from
a number of factors, but it most likely
reflects Dallas firms’ hiring of an in-
creasing number of non-Dallas residents
(who are not included in the household
survey estimates for the area). If the
commuting becomes common enough,
the boundaries of the metropolitan areas
will be expanded after the 2000 census
to sweep up the outlying counties and
reflect the new economic reality.
1
While rising wages will pull some
people out of school or retirement and
others out of an adjacent county, the
supply side is only part of the market
response to tight labor markets. Firms
are the other side of the equation, and
they are as likely to move as workers.
Firms often cite the availability of work-
ers with the appropriate skills as a
major factor in their location decisions.
If firms cannot expand easily or must
pay a wage premium to expand in
Austin or Dallas, they will expand else-
where instead. Some of those alterna-
tive locations will be in Texas, but not
all. For example, tight labor markets
were cited as one of the important fac-
tors behind Dell Computer Corp.’s re-
cent decision to build its first major
non-Austin facility—in Tennessee. Thus,
even as good economic times continue,
job growth is likely to slow significantly
in Austin and Dallas.
—Lori L. Taylor
Taylor is a senior economist and policy
advisor in the Research Department at the
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.   Note
1 An outlying county is included in a metropolitan statistical area
(MSA) on the basis of commuting patterns and the urbanicity and
population density of the outlying county. Generally, counties are not
added to MSAs between censuses unless the central city expands
into the county (through annexation, for example).
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The Tightest Labor Markets
Attract the Most Workers
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NOTE: The employment rate is household employment
divided by the working-age population.
SOURCES: Bureau of Labor Statistics; Bureau of the
Census.VER SINCE BEN Franklin wrote
“A penny saved is a penny
earned,” Americans have been
taught that saving is a virtue.
1
Having accepted this principle,
many economic observers are
concerned about the recent sharp de-
cline in America’s personal saving rate.
Many economists are also concerned be-
cause they believe personal saving is a
requisite for economic growth and prog-
ress. Such progress requires a steady
stream of investment expenditures for
the development of new technologies
and for the purchase of new plant and
equipment. To generate this investment
stream, society must forgo current con-
sumption so resources can be diverted
from the production of consumer goods
to the production of capital, or invest-
ment, goods. Saving, then, is the means
by which resources are diverted from
current consumption to future growth.
As can be seen in Chart 1, the per-
sonal saving rate has moved irregularly
downward since 1980 and by 1998 was
close to zero. The Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) rate actually dropped
below zero in 1998 and has remained
negative in 1999.
2
The near-zero and negative monthly
personal saving rates for 1998 and 1999
represent a dramatic break with the
past. Monthly saving rates in the late
1970s and early 1980s generally oscil-
lated between 6 percent and 10 percent,
with a spike up to 13.6 percent in 1980
(Federal Reserve series). Since the early
1980s, however, the rate of personal
saving has shown a marked decline, in-
terrupted only by a modest recovery 
between 1989 and 1992. The average
monthly saving rate for 1988–91 (5.5
percent) was one-fourth lower than that
for 1975–81 (7.2 percent). More re-
cently, the 1995–98 rate (2 percent) was
only about one-fourth that of 1975–81.
The persistent decline in the per-
sonal saving rate seems paradoxical, as
American living standards have been
steadily improving and the nation’s
stock indexes rising.
3 Commentators
have sought to explain this phenome-
non by pointing to policy decisions or
the economic trends of the past two
decades. Tax rate increases adopted in
1990 and 1993 and the rising trade
deficit have been popular targets. Some
economists speak of a change in the
very nature of Americans—from Ben
Franklin-like good citizens who see sav-
ing as a virtue to profligate consumers
who see conspicuous consumption and
even excess debt as privileges of an ad-
vanced economy infected with “luxury
fever.”
4 Both the current administration
and Congress have proposed legislation
to address America’s alleged inadequate
saving rate. It is now a virtual media
pastime to bemoan the nation’s profli-
gacy and the problems our current
“consumption-binge” mentality is bound
to create for future generations.
Should we worry about the saving
rate trend? If today’s saving behavior 
is a rational, healthy response to eco-
nomic conditions, we can ignore the
rhetoric about approaching disaster.
When one looks at the entire economic
picture and employs better indicators of
the consumption/saving trade-off than
the simple personal saving rate, the
often-invoked “savings crisis” disappears.
This is important because it means 
we can stop fretting over whether eco-
nomic growth will suffer and whether
Americans will have sufficient resources
for their futures.
Why Saving Is Higher Than It Appears
To save is to postpone consumption.
A nation saves when a portion of cur-
rent output is not consumed today but
set aside for the future as either finished
goods or capital investment. Actually,
America’s personal saving might be
higher than it appears in Chart 1 be-
cause the chart does not include all
forms of saving (nonconsumption). The
personal saving rate is derived by divid-
ing personal savings of all Americans by
their aggregate personal disposable in-
come. But these terms do not mean
what most Americans might think be-
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SOURCES: Federal Reserve Board; Bureau of Economic Analysis.cause personal saving is not calculated
by adding up the various saving instru-
ments of the population. On the con-
trary, the personal saving rate is an
accounting construct calculated by sub-
tracting personal consumption expendi-
tures from personal disposable income
(the latter being personal income less
taxes), then dividing the result by per-
sonal disposable income. Derived in
this manner, the personal saving rate
does not include corporate saving, the
accumulation of consumer durables or
human capital expenditures.
Chart 2 illustrates the effects of in-
cluding these related economic magni-
tudes in private sector saving. The chart
adds to personal saving the net accu-
mulation of consumer durables, undis-
tributed corporate profits—which the
BEA includes in private saving but not
in personal saving—and human capital
investment as measured by personal ed-
ucation expenditures.
5 Not surprisingly,
this chart gives a brighter picture of
what Americans are doing with their in-
comes. As Chart 3 shows, they are cur-
rently saving at an annual rate of about
10.25 percent of their personal income.
6
People do not save for the sake of
saving. They save to spread consump-
tion over their lives. It is interesting to
note, then, that when they purchase
durable goods or education, the official
saving rate falls. In fact, Americans’
spending on durables and education is
rising faster than income. Certainly,
some of these expenditures may not
prove effective in providing for future
consumption, and our savings defini-
tion is open to criticism on those
grounds. Nevertheless, these additions
need to be carefully considered before
drawing the conclusion that the savings
sky is falling.
Net Worth: The Missing Variable?
Perhaps personal saving isn’t even the
right statistic to analyze when seeking
to understand America’s consumption/
investment trade-offs. Americans save
by accumulating a portfolio of assets,
some financial and some nonfinancial
(durables and education expenditures,
as previously noted). If the value of
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.Americans’ total portfolio rises, their net
worth rises and less immediate saving 
is required. In fact, we ought to see an
inverse relationship between what the
Commerce Department calls personal
saving and overall net worth, and we
do. Chart 4 shows real net worth rising
at a record rate since the mid-1980s.
The value of stock portfolios rose
from $7.2 trillion in 1996 to $10.8 trillion
in 1998, a staggering 50 percent in-
crease in just two years. And the equi-
ties market has continued to climb to
new records in 1999. The present net
worth of all U.S. households is $36.8
trillion, almost double the 1996 com-
bined GDPs of the world’s five largest
economies—the United States, Germany,
France, Great Britain and Japan. At the
same time, according to the Federal 
Reserve’s funds flow report, consumer
debt has grown more slowly than asset
appreciation. 
Americans are taking on more debt
because they can afford to. Chart 5
shows that households hold more than
six times their current incomes as net
assets. Not surprisingly, as Chart 6 clearly
shows, they have increased their con-
sumption, and their ability to spend
comfortably, as their net worth has
risen. As opportunity, stability, low un-
employment and economic growth have
become the new American economic
norm, the simpler “saving or consump-
tion” world has become obsolete. For
this reason, we should not expect par-
ticipants in an evolving, national mar-
ket economy to save, year after year,
some predictable, constant percentage
of their income.
As the nation’s wealth, demographic
makeup and economic opportunities
change, so might the personal saving
rate. What we have shown thus far is
that when a definition of asset accumu-
lation more comprehensive than “per-
sonal saving” is used, the so-called
savings crisis largely disappears. Ameri-
cans are spending today as if they be-
lieve that not only is there a tomorrow,
but it’s going to be a very good one.
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Page  7
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Economic Analysis.Some Policy Considerations
No economist or government agency
knows the economically optimal alloca-
tion between current and future con-
sumption. Only individuals can make
such choices, and they do so based 
on their goals, means, expectations and
incentives. Even though U.S. private
saving has declined less than critics
claim—and asset accumulation not at
all—it may still be desirable for Ameri-
cans to save more to stimulate private
investment and capital formation. Amer-
icans now face a number of disincen-
tives to save. Several current govern-
ment policies discourage saving. Some
possible changes that would increase
saving are as follows:
• Tax consumption, not income.
Taxing income only when spent—
not when saved—would encour-
age private saving and asset accu-
mulation. Under certain assump-
tions, equivalent results could be
achieved by eliminating the tax on
capital income, such as dividends,
interest and capital gains. Either of
these reforms would eliminate the
double tax currently imposed on
savers.
• Reduce or eliminate the corporate
income tax. Short of eliminating
tax on all capital income, repeal of
the corporate income tax would
reduce the overly burdensome tax
on saving and investment in U.S.
business. Investors in U.S. corpora-
tions currently pay three taxes—
one when the money is earned,
one when the business earns a
profit (the corporate profits tax)
and one when the dividends are
paid out to shareholders. Saving
and investment thus suffer.
• Reduce or eliminate the “death”
tax. The estate and gifts tax has be-
come increasingly onerous in re-
cent years as markets have lifted
Americans’ wealth above the un-
taxed household ceiling (currently
$650,000 and rising to $1 million in
2006). Eliminating this tax would
encourage private saving, espe-
cially lifetime wealth accumulated
in family-owned businesses and
farms, which under current law
often must be sold to pay the tax.
• Simplify and stabilize the tax code.
A small, simple and predictable tax
is best for stimulating economic ac-
tivity, including saving. When the
tax code is difficult to understand
and interpret, or subject to fre-
quent and extensive revision, pri-
vate saving suffers.
• Reform the federal bankruptcy code.
Generous federal bankruptcy laws
encourage citizens to spend and
borrow without consequence. Tight-
ening the laws would encourage
Americans to accumulate wealth, not
debt.
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Chart 6
Consumption and Net Worth
Percent Ratio
Net worth/personal disposable income (ratio)

















SOURCES: Federal Reserve Board; Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Americans now 





The authors thank Mike Cox, Jason Saving and Alan Viard for their
valuable input, and Justin Marion and Kathryn Cook for research
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1 Old Ben understated his case. A 22-year-old who saves a penny and
receives the average rate of return of the S&P 500 across the inter-
vening years will have 32 pennies when he retires at age 67.
2 On September 8 of this year, the Commerce Department’s Bureau of
Economic Analysis announced it has decided to revise the calcula-
tion, retroactively to 1929, of several macroeconomic variables, in-
cluding the personal saving rate. Government workers’ pension
contributions will now be counted as personal, rather than govern-
ment, saving. While this does not change GDP, it does increase the
personal saving rate by an estimated 1.5 percent to 2 percent, or
about $100 billion in the 1990s alone.
3 W. Michael Cox and Richard Alm, Myths of Rich and Poor: Why
We’re Better Off Than We Think (New York: Basic Books, 1999).
4 Robert H. Frank, Luxury Fever: Why Money Fails to Satisfy in an 
Era of Excess (New York: Free Press, 1999). The New York Times
agrees: Stephen Roach, “Spending Ourselves into Oblivion,” De-
cember 11, 1998, p. 35.
5 The net accumulation of consumer durables taken from BEA data
represents purchases less depreciation. For human capital expendi-
tures, no official data series exists to use as a basis on which we
could reliably measure and subtract depreciation. Also, we have re-
vised only the private side of saving, ignoring the upward trend in
government saving. Federal, state and local government surpluses
make up part of national saving and must be considered before mak-
ing judgments about a “savings crisis.”
Just prior to publication, we became aware of similar work by
William Gale and John Sabelhaus (“Perspectives on the Household
Saving Rate,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, no. 1, 1999,
pp. 181–224), who reach similar conclusions, although we were
working independently. Although their revised savings definition is
not the same as ours, they estimate about a 2 percent decline in sav-
ing during 1975–98, consistent with what we found.
6 The ratio we use in Chart 3, personal savings and related items/
personal disposable income and undistributed corporate profits, has
been relatively stable since 1970, peaking at 17 percent in 1973 and
moving slightly downward during the following decade but never
varying during that decade by more than 2 percent. To avoid artifi-
cially increasing the ratio, we add undistributed corporate profits to
the denominator as well as to the numerator.
Conclusion
The general query “Is America saving
enough?” is probably not answerable. For
years, many policy commentators have
warned that frugal Japan would some-
day overtake America as the world’s
premier economic power. That was be-
fore the Japanese economy sank, many
of its larger banks encountered financial
difficulties, and its stock and real estate
markets collapsed. Japan’s high national
saving rate did not prevent economic
turmoil, nor is it helping Japan over-
come it. What policy advice has Japan
received from the same commentators
who decry America’s profligate ways?
Consume more and save less!
It has probably always been the case
that some people save too much and
others save too little, at least from the
perspective of third-party observers. But
since individuals differ in their goals, it
is problematic to evaluate the saving of
an entire nation. In view of the argu-
ments presented here, though, it is clear
that pessimism regarding Americans’
saving is largely unfounded.
We should remember that our na-
tional income accounting definitions
were created in another era—one dom-
inated by physically countable manu-
factured and agricultural output. Today,
information and services are the twin
pillars on which the growth and pros-
perity of our economy rest. It does us
little good to continue attempting to
navigate tricky public policy shoals with
antiquated national income and product
accounts gauges. As our economy and
economic theories change, so must our
methods of measurement. Only then can
we hope to accurately judge whether
Americans are saving too little…or too
much.
— Robert L. Formaini
Richard B. McKenzie
Formaini is a senior economist in the
Research Department of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas. McKenzie is a professor in
the Graduate School of Management at the
University of California, Irvine.
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ANUARY 1 MARKED the formal
launch of Economic and Mone-
tary Union (EMU) in Europe as
11 nations of the European
Union (EU) merged their cur-
rencies into a new single cur-
rency, the euro, and ceded sovereignty
over monetary policy to a new supra-
national institution, the European Cen-
tral Bank (ECB). The 11-nation entity
that shares this new currency is similar
in size (economically) to the United
States, automatically making the euro
the world’s second most important cur-
rency after the dollar. 
The launch of the euro and the cre-
ation of the ECB to manage it are part
of the longer-term process of European
integration that began shortly after
World War II. The euro’s creation elimi-
nates all exchange rate risk between the
participating nations and will further
deepen the single market in goods and
services that has existed since 1992. By
ceding sovereignty over monetary pol-
icy to the ECB, individual countries can
no longer tailor their monetary policies
to domestic economic conditions, but
must instead accept the policy set by
the ECB on the basis of economic con-
ditions in the euro area as a whole.
It is too early to say for sure whether
EMU will succeed and whether the euro
will be a strong currency. Many econo-
mists have raised serious doubts about
the wisdom of EMU and have argued
that the project is doomed to fail sooner
or later. Periods of boom in some coun-
tries that are accompanied by periods of
recession in others, in conjunction with
limited labor mobility, will create strains
that will test the new institutions. The
skeptics point to historical evidence that
monetary unions that are not accompa-
nied by political unions invariably fail.
The optimists point to the important
role shared currencies play in building a
common political identity and note that
EMU differs in many important respects
from earlier attempts at monetary union.
The fact that EMU membership goes
hand in hand with access to the single
market makes the costs of seceding
from the monetary union quite high.
Also, the creation of a single institution
(the ECB) to manage the new currency,
and the accountability of the ECB to the
European Parliament, should enhance
the legitimacy and durability of EMU.
It is also too soon to tell whether the
euro will prove to be a strong currency
and a worthy successor to the perenni-
ally strong Deutsche mark. Insofar as it
is possible to design a currency to be
strong, the euro has a lot going for it.
Current conventional wisdom holds that
central bank independence is a key pre-
requisite of a strong currency. The ECB
is probably the most independent cen-
tral bank in the world, and it has an un-
ambiguous mandate for the pursuit of
price stability. The ECB is only obliged
to support the other policies of the 
EU to the extent that this support does
not compromise its primary objective 
of price stability. But the ECB will be
entering uncharted territory when it
comes to building a constituency for its
policies across national borders. The
ability of Deutsche Bundesbank to pur-
sue an independent monetary policy
was due in no small part to the popular
support it enjoyed among the German
electorate.
Much was made earlier this year of
the euro’s steady fall against the dollar
on foreign exchange markets (Chart 1).
To some this was a sign of inherent
weakness in the new currency. How-
ever, a number of factors should be
considered before reading too much
into short-term movements in the dollar–
euro exchange rate. First, at least part of
the decline was simply an unwinding of
the appreciation of the legacy curren-
cies against the dollar in the latter half
of 1998. As relative growth prospects in
the United States and the EU shifted, so
too did the exchange rate. Second, un-
certainty about the direction of eco-
nomic policy in Germany, the euro area’s
largest economy, and confusion about
the ECB’s attitude toward exchange rate
developments detracted from market
confidence in the first months of the
new currency’s existence. 
The exchange rate has been more
stable in the past couple of months, as
the outlook for growth in Europe has
improved. There is growing evidence
that the slowdown in economic activity
in Europe that began late last year has
come to an end and that the continent
is poised for faster growth in the com-
ing year. Both Germany and Italy show
signs of an upturn in economic activity,
while the countries on the periphery
(Finland, Ireland, Spain and Portugal)
continue to grow rapidly. The ECB’s first
real test will occur when it comes time
to raise interest rates to stave off in-
cipient inflation.
—Mark A. Wynne
Wynne is a senior economist and research
officer in the Research Department at the
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
The World’s Newest Currency
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Further Information 
on the Data
For more information on employment
data, see “Reassessing Texas Employment
Growth” (Southwest Economy, July/August
1993). For TIPI, see “The Texas Industrial 
Production Index” (Dallas Fed Economic 
Review, November 1989). For the Texas
Leading Index and its components, see 
“The Texas Index of Leading Indicators: 
A Revision and Further Evaluation” (Dallas
Fed Economic Review, July 1990).
Online economic data and articles are
available on the Dallas Fed’s Internet web
site, www.dallasfed.org.
May–July 1999
Net Contributions of Components to Change in Leading Index
Total Nonfarm Employment
Index, January 1996 = 100
Texas Industrial Production Index
Index, January 1996 = 100
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SWE SWE SWE Regional Update Regional Update
WO YEARS AGO, Texas energy producers were going
like gangbusters. Futures markets predicted the price
of West Texas Intermediate crude would stay near $20
per barrel for the foreseeable future. Industry contacts
reported shortages of rigs and personnel. There was a
12- to 18-month backlog for drill pipe.
Four months later, the price dropped below $19 per barrel
and stayed there for nearly two years. In December 1998, as
producers were setting their exploration budgets for 1999, the
price of West Texas Intermediate hit a 12-year low of less than
$11 per barrel.
Today, although the price of oil is again well above $20 per
barrel, drilling activity has not recovered. Extraction employ-
T
Regional Economic Indicators
Texas employment* Total nonfarm employment*
Texas Private
Leading TIPI** Construc- Manufac- Govern- service- New
Index total Mining tion turing ment producing Texas Louisiana Mexico
7/99 125.3 126.2 150.0 530.9 1,102.7 1,530.6 5,904.3 9,218.5 1,906.7 730.2 
6/99 124.1 125.8 149.9 528.3 1,100.5 1,530.6 5,893.2 9,202.5 1,909.2 729.8 
5/99 123.1 125.9 150.4 527.6 1,100.2 1,530.9 5,868.3 9,177.4 1,905.2 730.0
4/99 123.6 125.5 152.3 529.0 1,101.1 1,529.0 5,850.7 9,162.1 1,905.1 731.5
3/99 121.9 126.5 155.6  524.6 1,102.9 1,528.9 5,835.3 9,147.3 1,896.9 730.0
2/99 121.7 127.2 156.4  523.6 1,104.6 1,525.9 5,819.4 9,129.9 1,897.8 727.6
1/99 121.9 127.2 157.2  518.6 1,106.1 1,524.4 5,802.6 9,108.9 1,897.6 729.0
12/98 121.3 127.6 159.3  513.8 1,107.0 1,519.0 5,782.3 9,081.4 1,903.5 724.4 
11/98 120.7 128.3 160.5  508.2 1,107.3 1,510.5 5,752.8 9,039.3 1,899.6 724.1 
10/98 122.3 128.6 162.5  506.3 1,109.5 1,506.5 5,729.4 9,014.2 1,895.3 722.7 
9/98 120.4 129.1 164.6  502.6 1,113.6 1,502.6 5,707.8 8,991.2 1,895.7 721.1 
8/98 120.8 129.7 165.9  500.3 1,111.0 1,506.8 5,693.2 8,977.2 1,894.2 721.4 
* in thousands
** Texas Industrial Production Index
 
ment is showing hints of renewal but remains 16,500 jobs
below its year-ago level. The Texas rig count has changed di-
rection recently but has only climbed back to its August 1998
level (see chart below). It will need to increase by 40 percent
to reach the level it attained the last time prices were this good.
The cautious industry response probably reflects a belief
that recent price increases are a temporary windfall. The fu-
tures market expects prices to fall to the $18–$19 range next
year. However, even with the declines, oil prices are still ex-
pected to exceed the levels on which the drilling budgets
were based and remain well above the December 1998 level.
—Lori L. Taylor
Focus on the Energy IndustrySWE SWE SWE Upcoming Event Upcoming Event
NAFTA
The First Five Years
November 4–5 , 1999
El Paso Marriott Hotel
Authorities from the official and private sectors of the 
United States, Canada and Mexico will discuss:
• Trilateral impact on trade, investment and jobs
• Side agreements on labor and the environment
• Impact on U.S.–Mexico border and maquiladora industry
• Feasibility of North American monetary union and a 
single NAFTA currency
• Progress toward a Free Trade Area of the Americas
For more information call 915-521-8235
NAFTA
The First Five Years
An International Conference sponsored by the
El Paso Branch 
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
p.o. box 655906
Dallas, Texas 75265-5906
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